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This introduction brieﬂy examines the emerging ﬁeld of ‘conﬂict-free’, ‘fair’, and ‘transparently sourced and
traded’ minerals and the dynamics of their supply chains. Linking the growing prevalence of Corporate Social
Responsibility norms in the global mining industry with increasing awareness of reputational risks associated
with mineral extraction and trading that are associated with environmental impacts and armed conﬂict, the
paper provides an overview of the Kimberley Process for rough diamonds and the various supply chain initiatives
that it has inspired over the past 15 years. It distinguishes between conﬂict-free supply chains; eﬀorts to embrace
Fair Trade in artisanal mineral supply chains; and a third group of independently-organized interventions that
lay claim to ‘ethical’ or ‘fair’ labels for often very speciﬁc instances. Finally, it provides a brief overview of the
papers included in the Special Section.
1. Introduction: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the
global mining industry
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and sustainable development
discourses and practices have dramatically reshaped the global mining
industry in the past two decades (Dashwood, 2012). After a disastrous
stretch in the late 1990s, when commodity prices were low and several
mining-induced environmental disasters “had spurned a signiﬁcant, and
increasingly global, environmental movement against mining”, key
constituents of the mining industry came together and launched the
Global Mining Initiative, which led to the undertaking of the Mining,
Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) Project and the es-
tablishment of the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM),
initiatives that ﬁrmly linked the mining industry with ongoing con-
versations on sustainable development (Franks, 2015, pp. 6–10). Yet
despite this dramatic shift in thinking, and despite the public engage-
ment of many of large-scale mining companies in particular, ICMM
membership only accounts for 40–50% of global mine production, with
the other half taken care of by Junior and mid-level miners, state-
owned miners, and artisanal and small-scale miners (Franks, 2015, pp.
128–130). Reconciling mining and sustainable development remains an
arduous process, fraught not only with the dangers involved with the
hazardous extraction of various minerals from the earth, but also with
the risks associated with doing business in developing countries with
unstable or autocratic political systems and relatively weak institutions
and regulatory/enforcement capacities.
Another issue, which, like the norms associated with CSR, has taken
on increasing prominence over the past two decades, is the industry-
wide reputational risk now associated with mining or trading minerals
that have become embroiled in armed conﬂicts. In trying to manage
these risks, the global mining industry has started to implement the
techniques of governance of what has been called ‘regulatory capit-
alism’, whereby “the state retains responsibility for steering, while
business increasingly takes over the functions of service provision and
technological innovation”, including “the creation of internal controls
and mechanisms of self-regulation in the shadow of the state” (Levi-
Faur, 2005, p. 15). Just as the chemical industry responded to the 1984
Bhopal disaster (which led to the demise of Union Carbide and stained
the reputation of the entire industry) by setting up a self-regulatory
regime requiring “large ﬁrms to sustain a chain of stewardship for their
chemicals upstream and downstream”, thereby giving it the authority
to regulate the behaviour of smaller ﬁrms (Braithwaite, 2011), the
mining industry (often spurred by its direct consumers, such as the
jewellery or electronics industry) is currently undergoing similar
transformations.
Indeed, many current initiatives that are being supported by key
players in the mining industry are promoting a host of principles
dedicated to sustainability, but can also be seen as a way of insulating
the ‘responsible’ members of the mining industry from those who, by
omission, are less so and who could, in the future, be responsible for the
next environmental disaster due to mismanagement, or provide the
spark for the next big activist campaign due to links with unsavoury
regimes or atrocities. Artisanal mining in particular is often mentioned
when industry oﬃcials talk about reputational risk. It should, therefore,
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not come as a surprise that many of the currently-active mineral supply
chain initiatives have clearly identiﬁed artisanal and small-scale mining
(ASM) as a problem for which they propose technocratic solutions,
thereby sidestepping thorny questions of political economy that stand
in the way of successful resolutions, yet deftly manoeuvring the in-
dustry actors supporting these initiatives out of the line of ﬁre.
2. The emergence of ethical and certiﬁed mineral supply chains
The emergence of certiﬁcation schemes as “a form of private gov-
ernance established by nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and
businesses to advance responsible production practices” has been quite
remarkable, especially in the forestry, coﬀee, and ﬁsheries sectors
(Auld, 2014). Increasingly, mine production, in particular of minerals
that play key roles in the jewellery and electronics sectors, has become
a space in which certiﬁcation technologies are rising in prominence.
Indeed, the demand for fair or conﬂict-free, transparently and
equitably sourced and traded goods and services has never been so
high. In the agricultural sector and, to an increasing extent, the gar-
ments industry, retailers and manufacturers are responding to growing
consumer demand for products that are sourced ethically and can be, at
least in the aggregate, traced back to their site of production. This
‘ethical turn’ in consumption has also aﬀected the mining sector, an
industry that has recently worked to redeﬁne its social and environ-
mental responsibilities. A number of organisations operating at dif-
ferent scales and in a range of geographical contexts have worked to
improve transparency in the mining sector in a number of ways. These
include the certiﬁcation of mineral production as environmentally and
socially responsible, free from linkages with armed conﬂict, and the
empowerment of marginalized mine operators through a more direct
connection between their activities and the imperatives of retail and
manufacture.
For now, three main currents are observable. First are those in-
itiatives that explicitly try to sever the links between mining or minerals
trading and armed conﬂict or the funding thereof. This remains the
most important current relative to political and ﬁnancial capital in-
vested, as well as its potential impact (both positive and negative) on
the areas where the minerals are mined. With the Kimberley Process as
a notable exception, these initiatives are currently geographically lim-
ited to the African Great Lakes region, although upcoming EU regula-
tion includes non-geographically speciﬁc wording of conﬂict resources.
The second are the initiatives, limited in number yet growing, that
are explicitly linked to the internationally recognized ‘Fair Trade’
movement and whose aim it is to source artisanally-mined minerals for
the Western jewellery industry. This is similar to what has been done
for luxury coﬀee and cocoa. A ﬁnal current is broad, as it based on
exclusion (as in, not part of the ﬁrst two currents). It contains initiatives
that aim to provide consumers or consumer-facing industries with more
ethical, transparent and fair supply chains (often using those concepts
in fuzzy and interchangeable ways) that are not linked to the estab-
lished Fair Trade movement. This group is very heterogeneous, com-
prising initiatives sourcing rubies from Malawi (Hilson, 2014), ‘fair’
cellphones,1 the Maendeleo Diamond Standards,2 De Beers’ Forever-
mark diamonds which come with ID inscription that can be searched on
a special website,3 as well as various interventions that have emerged
recently to make use of the much-hyped Blockchain technology to
create tamper-proof supply chains.4
2.1. Patient zero? The diamond industry and the Kimberley Process
Illustrating the speed at which this occurred, an otherwise vocal
supporter of what he termed the ‘certiﬁcation revolution’ (Conroy,
2007) in 2001 wrote about the diﬃculty in seeing voluntary certiﬁca-
tion work in the mining sector, given mining companies’ lack of direct
links to consumers. Signiﬁcantly, the author explicitly mentioned the
diamond industry as an exception, yet erroneously attributed it ex-
clusively to its then-monopoly structure (Conroy, 2001). Indeed, at that
time negotiations were ongoing to create a self-regulatory regime for
rough diamond trade, using certiﬁcation as a basis, thereby voluntarily
closing the global rough diamond market for non-participating coun-
tries and ﬁrms.
While not exactly a closely held secret (Van Bockstael, 2014, p. 11),
international news media in the late 1990s were shocked to report on
what quickly became known as ‘blood’ or ‘conﬂict’ diamonds. Based on
investigations by a UN Panel of Experts investigating (among other
instances of sanctions busting) the smuggling of rough diamonds by the
Angolan rebel movement UNITA, and by NGOs Global Witness (also on
Angola) and Partnership Africa Canada (on Sierra Leone), the world’s
attention became focused on the way in which diamonds were being
used by certain rebel movements to ﬁnance armed conﬂict. The inter-
national diamond industry, fearing public outcry and doing its best to
stymie discussions of consumer boycotts by referring to the key eco-
nomic contribution of diamonds to countries such as Botswana, Na-
mibia, and South Africa, was forced to respond. A meeting hosted by
the SADC in the historic diamond mining town of Kimberley in South
Africa became the starting point for a series of globetrotting negotia-
tions involving representatives of diamond producing and trading
countries, the international diamond industry (in which the Belgian
port city of Antwerp, as the key trading hub for rough diamonds, and
the De Beers diamond mining and trading company, controlling what
was then a monopolistically structured industry, were the two domi-
nant players), and international civil society. At the end of 2002, the
negotiations of the Kimberley Process gave birth to the Kimberley
Process Certiﬁcation Scheme (KPCS), which entered into force in 2003
(Bieri, 2010; Grant and Taylor, 2004; Smillie, 2014; Van Bockstael,
2014; Wright, 2004).
The KPCS is essentially a closed market: only participating countries
are allowed to trade rough diamonds with each other. Conversely, it is
up to individual participating countries to monitor rough diamond
mining (and/or trading) on their territories, and subsequently certify
that the diamonds exported were indeed mined in that country. This, it
goes without saying, is slightly easier to monitor in an industrially
exploited diamond mine in Botswana as opposed to the vast dia-
mondiferous regions that characterise secondary diamond deposits and
are often exploited by large numbers of informal miners, for example in
Liberia. Indeed, given that the ‘conﬂict diamond problem’ was essen-
tially shorthand for ‘the problem of artisanal-alluvial exploitation of
diamonds in weak states by impoverished, informally operating groups
of (former) peasants who fell prey to armed groups’, the Kimberley
Process’ main challenges continue to lie in the artisanal mining areas of
its weakest members (Vlassenroot and Van Bockstael, 2008).
The issue of artisanal mining is indeed so complex and deeply re-
lated to rural poverty and processes of de-agrarianisation that it is a
development problem in need of development solutions. Repeated calls
have been made to broaden the KPCS mandate, which is currently very
speciﬁc due to its UN roots, and focuses exclusively on the ﬁnancing of
non-state armed actors, thereby letting violent governments oﬀ the
hook. Indeed, key civil society co-founders have publicly left the
Kimberley Process in frustration over the lack of reform on this thorny
subject. Yet, similar calls to include a more proactive developmental
agenda towards ASM can only be interpreted as merely performative.
The fact that several members of the civil society and diamond industry
coalitions have joined together to create a new NGO, the Diamond
Development Initiative, to focus on these issues, and which stands
1 Fairphone, http://www.fairphone.com (accessed 20 December 2017)
2 DDI’s Maendeleo Diamond Standards, http://www.ddiglobal.org/login/resources/
overview-maendeleo-diamond-standards.pdf (accessed 20 December 2017)
3 De Beers Forevermark, http://www.forevermark.com (accessed 20 December 2017)
4 For example Everledger, https://www.everledger.io (accessed 20 December 2017)
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wholly outside of the Kimberley Process, illustrates the lack of con-
ﬁdence in ﬁnding a consensus among all KP participants to share the
undue burden carried by impoverished countries like Liberia and the
DRC, where 100% of all diamonds are artisanally mined.
Yet, it is thanks to the KP’s longevity (in contrast to its initial sense
of urgency) and success (currently, only diamonds from the eastern half
of the Central African Republic are banned by the KP as conﬂict dia-
monds), that we can now question whether enough attention has been
devoted to the developmental aspects of artisanal mining, or to the
actions of predatory regimes in sovereign states. Indeed, and taken into
consideration an entire scholarly literature questioning all too linear
assumptions regarding the complex relationship between ‘lootable’
minerals and (the ﬁnancing of) armed conﬂict (see, for example Le
Billon, 2006; Ross, 2006), it was never the intention of the Kimberley
Process to singlehandedly try and stop protracted conﬂicts. It has rather
sought to make it extremely diﬃcult that diamonds would be used to
ﬁnance them in the future. Its secondary purpose, and depending on
whose point of view those two could shift, was to act as the diamond
industry’s “primary safeguard against criminal inﬁltration or abuse
during armed conﬂict, and as a bulwark in its eﬀorts to provide as-
surance to consumers”, according to an inﬂuential industry insider
(Bone, 2012, p. 190). Currently, the KPCS can be considered as the
godfather of a myriad of innovations and interventions that have a
focus on artisanally mined minerals, almost all of them concentrating
on ‘conﬂict minerals’ in eastern DRC. Indeed, the emergence of the KP
dovetailed with the growing attention devoted to ‘the problem’ of ar-
tisanal mining in developing countries.
Often cited as a precursor in the consultancy reports that constitute
their frameworks, and with many lessons learned or at least identiﬁed,
the KP’s tri-partite multi-stakeholder model and the requirement to
inscribe KPCS procedures in participating nations’ laws, giving it legal
powers and the ability to punish violators, has yet to be copied or
emulated on the same global scale. Instead, regional initiatives exist
such as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, a su-
pranational organisation, which has set up its own Certiﬁcation
Mechanism to combat minerals smuggling, yet is heavily dependent on
international donors. Some private-sector led initiatives operate quite
insularly, such as the tin industry’s iTSCi system in eastern DRC, and are
primarily intended to avoid damage to the industry, rather than play a
dampening role on the conﬂict. And yet other initiatives, such as the US
legislation on conﬂict minerals (Dodd-Frank Act S.1502) are inscribed
into law yet provide for no penalties nor for a speciﬁc certiﬁcation
mechanism to follow. Indeed, as one critical observer recently put it
“the number of supply chain monitoring initiatives alone […] has be-
come almost as dizzying as the list of armed groups involved in the
conﬂict” (Kinniburgh, 2014, p. 64), and many of these initiatives face
issues of “questionable inter-operability” (Cuvelier et al., 2014, p. 5).
3. Papers in this special section
This special section brings together papers which reﬂect critically
on this emerging agenda of ethical and certiﬁed mineral supply chains,
oﬀering analysis of its rationales, eﬀects and overall reach. In parti-
cular, these contributions examine the progress, impact, and eﬀective-
ness of individual ethnical mineral schemes and complementary certi-
ﬁcation initiatives, and the policies responsible for their existence. Not
surprisingly, given the signiﬁcant amount of policy attention that has
been devoted to the protracted humanitarian crisis in eastern DRC and
the African Great Lakes Region at large, as it is in the world of supply
chain assurance and certiﬁcation, (papers on) the various DRC ‘conﬂict
minerals’ schemes occupy a dominant position in this Special Section.
A ﬁrst contribution, by Jose Diemel, looks at how the cassiterite and
coltan trade in the southern DRC province of Katanga has recently been
transformed, putting particular emphasis on the ways in which a
changing regulatory landscape has redeﬁned access to trade in artisanal
minerals. The study, based on ﬁeldwork conducted in Bukama
Territory, interrogates the process of territorialisation, and innovatively
focuses on access provision to the mineral trade, rather than to the
extractive process itself. The author argues that, as a result of unin-
tended institutional change caused by new international and national
regulations of the DRC mineral trade, access to the mineral trade has
instead become less transparent, and more complex and obscure.
A second contribution, by Claude Iguma Wakenge, similarly looks at
the changing nature of eastern DRC’s coltan mines, oﬀering ethno-
graphic insights into how reforms have triggered conﬂicts and disputes
over property rights and access to minerals. Focusing on two mine sites
in northern Katanga province, Iguma’s ﬁndings echo those of Diemel.
The author argues that the instrumentalisation of reform policies by
state authorities has reconﬁgured power relations in the region, and
shows that widespread attention and concern over ‘conﬂict minerals’
risks blinding us to the nature and eﬀects of new conﬂicts that have
arisen as a result of those reforms.
The third contribution, by Christoph Vogel, Josaphat Musamba and
Ben Radley, combines ethnographic research with a survey analysis in
order to gain insight into the impact of ‘conﬂict minerals’ initiatives and
reforms on the everyday life of miners, their families, and associated
professions. Based on research conducted in the South Kivu province,
where many traceability initiatives have been piloted, their paper takes
a longitudinal view and argues that the long-term legitimacy of ASM
formalisation is in danger, due to its negative association with inter-
ventions under the ‘conﬂict minerals’ banner, and the iTSCi programme
in particular.
In the penultimate contribution to this special section, and the ﬁrst
one not dealing with conﬂict-aﬀected minerals, Eleanor Fisher takes a
critical look at attempts to transform artisanal gold mining in Kenya,
Uganda and Tanzania, under the banner of the international Fairtrade
movement. While the project to extend Fairtrade gold to east Africa
remains at an early stage, Fisher nevertheless identiﬁes some key focus
points for the future; potential pitfalls but also potential avenues to
solidify these new ‘solidarities at a distance’.
Finally, Nelson Oppong has contributed a review of a recently
published book that aims to critically examine the ‘No Dirty Gold’
campaign, a pioneering activist campaign that targeted the gold in-
dustry’s negative environmental record in the slipstream of the ‘conﬂict
diamond’ campaign in the early 2000s.
4. Conclusion
Given the freshness of the ﬁeld, with many mineral supply chain
initiatives still in the pilot stages, this special section is only the start of
what we hope will be a fruitful scholarly debate. We look forward to
repeating this exercise in the future, occupying an entire special issue,
and wish to thank the editor of this journal for the conﬁdence and space
accorded to all contributors.
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